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Introduction 
The United Nations (UN) was founded at the end of World War II in an effort to create 
an international organization capable of addressing crises before they became wars. After the 
First World War the same effort resulted in the League of Nations; its failure eminently visible in 
the Second World War which followed just two decades later. There has yet to be another world 
war  since  the  United  Nations’  founding,  but  it  has  not  prevented  countless  smaller  conflicts  
during the Cold War and after.  
The ideal for what the United Nations would be was slowly built by President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt  over  the  course  of  his  administration.  His  vision,  originally  for  “four  policemen”  
ensuring  peace  around  the  world,  grew  to  become  one  based  around  the  “four  freedoms”  instead: 
freedom of religion and speech, and freedom from want and fear. Alongside a belief that these 
four freedoms were for all people around the globe, was a related faith that it must be achieved 
multilaterally. On the international stage the United States (US) was certainly powerful, but so 
were Great Britain and the Soviet Union (USSR), as well as the many smaller states if they acted 
together.  Thus  Roosevelt’s  vision  came  to  encompass  a  world  free  of  conflict,  with  nations  
working together to sustain that vision.  However,  soon  after  Roosevelt’s  death,  President  Harry  
Truman would turn the United States away from the organization, and its internationalist vision, 
toward an increasingly unilateral and confrontational foreign policy towards world crises. This 
shift ultimately ended any hope that the United Nations would be an effective organization at 
confronting a large-scale international crisis. 
 Truman, although supportive of an international activist foreign policy, did not share 
Roosevelt’s  ideals.  The United Nations would be left behind as many officials within the 
administration who believed in the organization left. Beginning with the San Francisco 
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Conference that established the United Nations, and continuing through his nearly two full terms 
in office, Truman would place the organization outside of the decision-making process with 
regards to international incidents. For Truman, the UN would simply be a rubber stamp on 
decisions  the  United  States  had  already  made.  Truman’s  clearest  choices  in  this  matter 
surrounded the Truman Doctrine, formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
and the Korean War. While reacting to domestic and international circumstances outside his 
direct control, with each incident, Truman pushed the organization aside in favor of unilateral US 
action  and  confrontation.  In  1947  the  Truman  Doctrine  committed  American  funding  to  all  “free  
peoples”  fighting  external  forces,  making  it  clear  that  it  was  not  the  UN’s  role  to  support  
endangered nations, but the United States’.  In  NATO  the  United  States  created  a  new  
organization, separate from the UN, to confront the Soviet Union. For Truman, the UN was not 
the forum for addressing crises, a military alliance was. Finally, in the Korean War the United 
States committed military forces prior to UN authorization for military action. Internally Truman 
went so far as to state the US would have headed into the conflict without UN approval. His 
administration would foil multiple attempts by the organization to negotiate peace over the 
course  of  the  war.  The  administration’s  decisions  left  the  multilateral  organization  without  a  
place in addressing a major global crisis.  
The multilateral system envisioned by Roosevelt was left behind by Truman, while the 
American people and Congress followed along after years of being pushed by Roosevelt to 
accept an international role for the United States. Most members of Congress came to share 
Truman’s  view  that  the  United  States  should  act  alone  on  the  global  stage,  and  while  there  was  
some dissent around many of his decisions, the administration always received the funding it was 
looking for. The American people initially supported the United Nations wholeheartedly, but 
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overtime their support was shown to be more temperamental, and any ire at the UN being 
ignored was weakly expressed.  
Much  of  the  writing  surrounding  the  transition  from  Roosevelt’s  to  Truman’s  presidency  
has focused on the development of the Cold War, and less so on the United Nations. Alonzo 
Hamby opens his work, Beyond the New Deal: Harry Truman and American Liberalism, by 
examining  what  Truman’s  rise  meant  for  liberalism  and  the  Democratic  party  moving  forward.  
With the death of Roosevelt, Hamby contends that liberalism no longer knew where it was 
going. Over the years of his presidency,  Roosevelt’s  personal  politics  had  slowly  come  to  be  
liberal politics and the politics of the Democratic party. Hamby asserts that Truman was a poor 
replacement  for  the  leadership  of  Roosevelt.  Liberalism’s  foreign  policy  had  consistently  
oscillated between being isolationist and internationalist based on the most recent failure, as seen 
in the internationalism of Wilson fading with his failure to convince the United States to join the 
League of Nations. Hamby argues that Truman was an explicit change from both Roosevelt and 
the Democratic party under his leadership. Under Truman, liberalism moved from its alliance 
with the popular front against fascism to  the  “vital  center”  against  communism.  The  Soviet  
Union had to be confronted and the bipartisan consensus against communism included Truman. 
Hamby concludes that with the end of the Second World War relations between the Soviet Union 
fell apart and required a change. Truman was dragged along by this change but also helped shape 
the response to it. The new face of liberalism, Truman reinforced that it was no longer for 
cooperation with the Soviet Union. Hamby shows that while Truman still supported domestic 
reform  in  the  mold  of  Roosevelt  with  his  “Fair  Deal”  programs,  foreign  policy  was  different.  
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Liberalism led by Truman had joined a consensus that the Soviet Union was a threat to be 
confronted, and no longer the ally of years before.1  
While Hamby addresses the political shift Truman oversaw, Gar Alperovitz addresses the 
foreign policy shift more explicitly in Atomic Diplomacy. Alperovitz suggests that from the 
moment Truman took office he began a shift towards confronting the Soviet Union, but that this 
change  escalated  with  the  testing  and  use  of  the  atomic  bomb.  He  argues  that  Truman’s  
overarching goal was to decrease the influence of the Soviet Union in Europe. With Truman and 
his  advisors  internally  accepting  that  Roosevelt’s  policy  of cooperation must be reconsidered, 
Truman broke with the prevailing consensus before the war was even over. Truman cut off Lend-
Lease support for the Soviet Union, and altered or broke the previous deals made between 
Roosevelt and Stalin at Yalta. The United States having the bomb, and the Soviet Union not, 
gave  Truman  the  confidence  to  “re-negotiate”  with  Stalin  at  Potsdam.  Alperovitz implies that the 
use of the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was in an effort to force the Soviet Union to 
back down  following  the  conference.  Alperovitz’s  work,  first  published  in  1965,  was  a  stark  
change  from  the  conventional  thinking  about  the  Cold  War.  In  arguing  that  Truman’s  decisions  
pushed the United States towards confrontation, instead of Soviet action demanding it, 
Alperovitz's work  opens  up  a  different  angle  on  the  conflict,  one  where  Truman’s  decisions  were  
intentional driving factors in arriving at the Cold War.2 
Although  Hamby’s  and  Alperovitz’s  works  provide  many  details,  neither  has  the  scope  of  
Robert Donovan’s  two  volume  series,  Conflict and Crisis3 and Tumultuous Years.4 While 
 
1 Alonzo L. Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism, Contemporary American 
History Series (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1973). 
2Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American 
Confrontation with Soviet Power, Expanded and Updated ed. (New York, NY: Penguin, 1985). 
3 Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948 (New York, NY: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1977). 
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published  five  years  apart,  the  two  volumes  are  decidedly  one  work.  Donovan  covers  Truman’s  
entire presidency, recounting his foreign policy decisions and dedicating ample time to the 
domestic  sphere.  Donovan’s  interpretation  of  Truman’s  policies  is  that  while  he  had  a  history  of  
anti-communism prior to ascending to the presidency, Truman was leading a consensus, not 
forging  a  totally  new  path  alone.  Truman’s  attitude  toward  the Soviet Union was a break from 
Roosevelt’s,  a  more  hardline  approach  for  the  new  president.  Donovan’s  work  portrays  Truman  
in part as fully aware of his turn away from the United Nations, observing the public backlash to 
the Truman Doctrine at first and the administration's effort to quell public criticism, but Donovan 
also displays him as a man oblivious to his decisions' effect on the organization. Truman and his 
administration believed that NATO, even though a new structure outside the UN, was in line 
with the principles of its Charter. Donovan is consistently sympathetic to this dichotomy in 
Truman between his supposedly intentional and unintentional decisions. He portrays Truman as 
a  “realist”  president,  confronting  the  Soviet  Union  with  the  backing  of a Cold War consensus. 
While he occasionally criticizes Truman for decisions like his loyalty program in the spring of 
1947, Donovan largely argues Truman was placed upon a path towards conflict with the Soviet 
Union and was unable to avoid the decisions surrounding the Truman Doctrine and Korean War 
he ultimately made. 
Lawrence  Kaplan’s  The United States and NATO: The Formative Years walks through 
how NATO came to be, and the first challenges it faced in the late 1940s. He argues that the 
alliance was the centerpiece  of  the  United  States’  policy  to  confront  the  Soviet  Union  but  also  
that the emphasis by contemporaries of the threat the Soviet Union presented was overblown. 
Kaplan summaries the establishment of the organization as a push from Europe to counter the 
 
4 Robert J. Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1949-1953 (New York, NY: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1982). 
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perceived Soviet aggression towards their occupations in West Germany. The argument in 
founding the alliance was not an easy one. Criticism came from those in favor of the United 
Nations, isolationists, and a fear that an alliance would pull American resources to Europe in the 
event  of  a  war.  Kaplan  closes  out  the  work  by  connecting  it  to  the  Korean  War.  NATO’s  large  
involvement in the conflict sealed its role as the military response to communism aggression. 
While the author does occasionally touch on  the  alliance’s  relationship  towards  the  UN,  it  is  a  
secondary  concern  of  the  work.  Kaplan’s  analysis of the alliance is thorough and places it firmly 
at  the  heart  of  Truman’s  foreign  policy  following  its  establishment.  In  the  author’s  eyes  the  
alliance is indicative of the Cold War as the new reality, and the response created out of joint 
American and European fears of Soviet aggression and anti-communism following the Second 
World War.5 
Lastly  is  John  Spanier’s  The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War. 
While the work obviously spends a significant amount of time on the relationship between 
Truman and General MacArthur leading up to and during the Korean War, Spanier also 
addresses how the United States entered the war in Korea, and how it interacted with the UN. 
Spanier’s  main  focus  when  referring  to  the  United  Nations  is  its  role  in  negotiations  between  
Communist China and the United States. He argues that the efforts by the United Nations to find 
a peaceful solution after China’s  entry  into  the  war  were  repeatedly  shot  down  by  the  United  
States, even though they had popular international support. The United States was determined 
that Communist China would not receive the Security Council seat then held by Nationalist 
China in exile, however this determination extended to any favorable deal towards the Chinese. 
When the United Nations was able to find deals supported by both neutral, communist, and 
 
5 Lawrence S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative Years (Lexington, KY: University Press of 
Kentucky, 2014), Accessed April 4, 2020. ProQuest Ebook Central. 
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democratic nations, some of whom were NATO members, the United States repeatedly 
demanded items China had expressly refused to consider therefore killing the deals. Spanier 
shows that the United States was willfully harming the organization's main mission of ensuring 
peace out of a desire to confront China. While not alone in this desire, the Truman administration 
led the country towards continued combat, even when the international majority wanted 
otherwise.6  
Although  existing  interpretations  of  Truman’s  foreign  policy  and  presidency  following  
Roosevelt’s  death  touch  upon  the  United Nations, it is often in a secondary capacity. The Cold 
War  framing  is  consistent  in  viewing  Truman’s  actions  towards  the  Soviet  Union,  however  it  
ignores  the  impact  these  actions  had  on  the  United  Nations’  effectiveness.  Kaplan,  Alperovitz,  
and Donovan all  note  that  Truman’s  foreign  policy  shift  away  from  Roosevelt  was  intentional,  
but focus on the effects for Cold War diplomacy outside of the United Nations, not how the 
organization’s  role  was  affected.  Ultimately  the  United  Nations’  role  is  left  to  the wayside as it 
became increasingly unimportant for how the United States and Soviet Union confronted one 
another  following  Truman’s  initial  decisions  to  push  the  organization  out  of  the  process,  leaving  
a lasting impact on the Cold War. 
 Roosevelt’s  vision  for  the  United  Nations  was  distinct  from  Truman’s,  as  seen  in  the  
latter’s  foreign  policy  decisions  over  the  course  of  his  presidency.  Truman’s  decisions  were  
purposeful, leading to an organization precluded from addressing a crisis. The first section 
covers  the  development  of  Roosevelt’s  vision.  The  second,  third,  and  fourth  sections  move  on  to  
Truman.  It  starts  with  his  ascension  to  the  presidency  following  Roosevelt’s  death,  and  the  
vitally important San Francisco Conference just two weeks later, and analyzes his major foreign 
 
6 John W. Spanier The Truman-Macarthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 
1959). 
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policy choices through the end of his presidency. Section Five focuses on public and 
congressional  reaction  to  Roosevelt’s  initial  vision  and  Truman’s  decisions  to  change  it.  
Although  Truman  claimed  the  mantle  of  Roosevelt’s  legacy, his decisions in foreign policy were 
a marked shift from Roosevelt, placing the UN outside the new framework emerging during the 
Cold War and leaving it as either a rubber stamp for prior choices, or a stage for lending 
unilateral action a multilateral image. Truman took the legacy created by Roosevelt, and 
manifested in the United Nations, and while promising to maintain it, did the opposite. Instead, 
he intentionally went around the organization to create a foreign policy based on unilateral action 
by the  United  States.  The  United  Nations  was  Roosevelt’s  solution  to  the  failures  of  the  League  
of  Nations.  Truman’s  actions  ensured  that  in  its  earliest  years  it  did  not  have  a  chance  to  stand  
before being pushed to the side and left in the cold for eight years, to waste away into an 
ineffective and secondary role. 
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Section  I.  Roosevelt’s  Vision 
Franklin  Delano  Roosevelt’s  vision  for  the  United  Nations  did  not  appear  in  isolation.  Its  
framework  and  founding  principles  are  outlined  in  Roosevelt’s  ‘Four  Freedoms’  speech  and  the  
Atlantic Charter, but it can also be found in his choice of advisors and early political life. The 
idea of a world organization was one Roosevelt considered across his time in politics, tempering 
his vision with the whims of public and congressional support. Eventually the Second World 
War offered an environment in need of the vision, an environment which changed in the year 
after  Roosevelt’s  death. 
 Roosevelt first ran for office in 1910 at twenty-eight years old; he won and became a 
state senator in New York. However, he would not remain in that office for long. Having been an 
avid supporter of Woodrow Wilson, whose internationalist streak he emulated, Roosevelt was 
offered a position as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. He accepted the role, and over the course 
of the Wilson administration became well known within Washington DC, which, alongside his 
household name as the cousin of a former president, propelled him to the vice presidential 
nomination in 1920. After the election loss, Roosevelt withdrew from public life for much of the 
next decade as a result of his polio diagnosis and ensuing efforts to keep the illness hidden. By 
1928 he had returned to politics, becoming the governor of New York from 1929-1933, followed 
by the presidency from 1933 until his death in 1945. While in his early presidency the Great 
Depression and economy were the central issues, the man who had defended the League of 
Nations while running for Vice President in 1920, and admired Wilson for his internationalism, 
was still present.7 
 
7 Alan Brinkley, "Roosevelt, Franklin Delano (30 January 1882–12 April 1945), thirty-second president of the 
United States." American National Biography. 1 Feb. 2000. Accessed 12 Mar 2020. https://www-anb-
org.ric.idm.oclc.org/view/10.1093/anb/9780198606697.001.0001/anb-9780198606697-e-0600567.  
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 Roosevelt’s  first  term  was  almost  solely  dedicated  to  the  New  Deal  and  addressing  the  
Great Depression, however the growing tension in both Asia and Europe weighed heavily on his 
mind. By his second term, while Roosevelt had always wanted to push the United States towards 
a  more  internationalist  foreign  policy,  public  concern  was  also  increasing.  Roosevelt’s  desire  to  
prepare the United States for a possible war forced him to make concessions in his domestic 
policy. In 1938 and 1939 he began advocating a larger military budget in the name of defense, 
careful not to propose an active foreign policy. In order to pass such legislation Roosevelt had to 
allow cuts to the New Deal programs in return. Many members of both parties were staunchly 
isolationist, others still anti-New Deal, thus Roosevelt was forced to choose. Ultimately he 
decided that preparing for war was more important than leaving his domestic program 
completely intact.8 As his second term came to a close, and France and Great Britain actively 
fought Nazi Germany, Roosevelt began pushing the United States more and more towards 
intervention. By early 1940 the United States had instituted its first peacetime draft, traded 
destroyers for bases with Great Britain, and set the Army and Navy to vastly expand.9 The 
United States was on a path to war, and while Roosevelt tried to downplay his internationalism 
in the 1940 election, he knew the country would need to play a larger role going forward. 
 The  first  clear  articulation  of  Roosevelt’s  ideals  for  a  post-war order came in the closing 
of  his  1941  State  of  the  Union.  The  ‘Four  Freedoms’  he  outlined  were  the  backbone  of  his  
international future. In the speech Roosevelt was explicit that freedom of speech and religion, 
and freedom from want and fear, was not just for the United States, but for anywhere in the 
world.  It  was  the  goal  for  his  new  international  system.  Roosevelt  believed,  “That  [the  Four  
Freedoms] is no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable 
 
8 Tugwell, Rexford G. Tugwell, F.D.R.: Architect of an Era (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1967), 184-185. 
9 Tugwell, 196-197. 
Dwyer 13 
   
 
in our own time  and  generation.”10 The  idea  of  the  ‘Four  Freedoms’  was  Roosevelt’s.  At  a  press  
conference six months prior he mentioned them in passing as his vision for long-term peace, 
although they were the five freedoms at the time, having included freedom of the press. Just as 
the  idea  was  his,  so  was  the  speech.  Roosevelt’s  speechwriter,  Robert  Sherwood,  comments  in  
his history of the relationship between close advisor Harry Hopkins and Roosevelt that the three 
of them worked on the speech together in December of 1940  but,  “Nobody  ghost  wrote  
those.”11The ideas in the 1941 State of the Union were dictated by Roosevelt, he constructed the 
speech and the vision it outlined. Roosevelt meant to act on that vision, to take the United States 
from an isolationist nation to a global leader. Consequently, it was his battle to fight, and not one 
to be left to another politician. 
Within  his  administration  Roosevelt’s  belief  in  the  ‘Four  Freedoms’  was  a  central  
ideological tenant shared by his advisors, such as Harry Hopkins. Hopkins, who consulted with 
Roosevelt  on  almost  everything  including  foreign  policy,  argued  that  the  ‘real’  Roosevelt  was  
seen  in  the  ‘Four  Freedoms’, not in his comments often tamping down an internationalist bent.12 
Behind the experienced politician was an idealist who believed such a future was possible for the 
United States, as long as someone was there to make it. As 1941 progressed, Roosevelt further 
understood  that  the  United  States’  position  as  the  ‘Arsenal  of  Democracy’  gave  him  unique  
leverage to shape the international system. With Great Britain turning to the United States to join 
in  the  war,  Roosevelt  resolved  that,  “he  would  only  urge  American  participation  in  the  war  if  the  
Allies would agree to a world organization projected beyond the war into a new kind of peace – 
 
10 Franklin  D.  Roosevelt,  “Annual  Message  to  Congress  January  6,  1941”  in  The Public Papers and Addresses of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 9, ed. Samuel I. Rosenman. (New York, NY: Macmillian 1941), 672. 
11 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History, rev. ed. (New York, NY: Harper, 1950) 230-
231. 
12 Sherwood, 266. 
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one  made  secure  by  an  organization  to  ensure  it.”13 Thus Roosevelt turned to the leader of the 
United  States’  closest  and  most  dependent  ally,  Winston  Churchill,  to  build  the  foundation  for  
his  “new  kind  of  peace.” 
 Churchill and Roosevelt signed the Atlantic Charter off the coast of Newfoundland in 
August of 1941. Although the United States was not yet in World War II, Roosevelt was 
exercising the influence of the American economy and lend-lease program to create a shared 
vision for the post-war world. Churchill, because of the weakened position of Great Britain, 
almost  unconditionally  signed  on  to  Roosevelt’s  ideas  expressed  in  the  charter.  Just  as  with  the  
Four  Freedoms,  the  Atlantic  Charter  was  based  upon  Roosevelt’s  vision  for  a  post-war peace. 
Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles helped write the charter that Roosevelt and Churchill 
would later sign, but Roosevelt himself personally edited the document along the way, ensuring 
it represented his view for long-term peace.14 As an empire, it was particularly challenging for 
Great Britain to accept free trade on the oceans, undercutting its monopoly of colonial markets, 
and self-determination, which could lead to the dissolution of the British Empire. However, 
Churchill had little choice  on  the  matter,  given  his  nation’s  dependence  on  American  support.   
On the point of an international organization, Roosevelt had less convincing to do, and 
instead was pressured by Secretary of State Cordell Hull toward making the future organization a 
truly  global  one.  Roosevelt’s  first  plan  of  ‘Four  Policemen’  ensuring  tranquility  in  different  
regions was flawed. It would have operated without input from the countless smaller nations who 
later supported the Allied war effort against Germany. Hull had been  Roosevelt’s  Secretary  of  
State since his first term, and had taken the lead on foreign policy while Roosevelt focused on his 
domestic agenda. Even as Roosevelt turned his attention to the war and international stage, Hull 
 
13 Tugwell, 212. 
14 Sherwood, 359. 
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still took a leading role in pushing Roosevelt to fulfill the ideals he set out in the Four 
Freedoms.15 Roosevelt’s  internationalism  was  not always consistent. At times he leaned towards 
a  future  foreign  policy  built  around  great  power  leadership,  without  other  nations’  input,  as  seen 
in his idea for the ‘Four  Policemen’. An international presence did not always mean cooperation 
with other states, but activism on the international stage, engaging with political crises the United 
States previously had not. However the international activism could have been achieved without 
an international organization. At the Atlantic Conference itself it was Churchill and Hopkins who 
urged Roosevelt to go farther and explicitly mention an international organization, making it a 
cooperative vision, rather than a unilateral one. Roosevelt was still wary of isolationists in the 
US and did not want to overreach only to have his vision undone. The American public seemed 
to be in favor of international activism, but an internationalist, and thus multilateral, policy 
would still be a push. However, for Churchill an international organization represented a needed 
commitment on the part of the United States to show it would participate in the war. In the end 
the  charter  refers  to  a  ‘permanent  system’  instead  of  an organization, but it was taken by all 
involved to mean the same thing.16 Roosevelt’s  vision  struck  a  balance  between  the  extremes.  On  
one side not committing the United States to a completely internationalist and cooperative world 
the isolationists would oppose, but still going beyond an international activism that would see the 
US act alone. This  balance  would  pervade  Roosevelt’s  future  choices,  and  be  in  stark  contrast  to  
Truman’s  activism  policy  just  under  five  years  later. 
Roosevelt’s  concern  about  the isolationists was warranted. The text of the charter 
released at the conference unintentionally left out freedom of religion. Sherwood later wrote that 
it was simply an oversight, and the proper text was included when the Atlantic Charter language 
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was used in the first UN declaration on January 1st, 1942. However, isolationists jumped on the 
incident  arguing  it  was,  “proof  of  the  subservience  of  the  cynical  Roosevelt  and  Churchill  to  the  
godless  Soviet  Union.”17 While clearly an overreaction, the incident showed the isolationists still 
held sway with the American public. Opinion was shifting, but not yet enough. The Atlantic 
Charter, even with some domestic backlash, was still a breakthrough in American foreign policy, 
distinguishing  Roosevelt’s  administration from the isolationism of the previous three presidents. 
The  United  States  was  now  ready,  “to  place  its  leadership  and  strength  on  the  scales  .  .  .  in  a  
supreme effort to bring into being a decent and peaceful post-war  world.”18 Although the 
Atlantic Charter only explicitly mentions Great Britain and United States, Roosevelt saw it as a 
framework  applying  to  all  peoples,  stating,  “The  Atlantic  Charter  applies  not  only  to  the  parts  of  
the world that border the Atlantic but to the whole world; disarmament of aggressors, self-
determination of Nations and peoples, and the four freedoms – freedom of speech, freedom of 
religion,  freedom  from  want,  and  freedom  from  fear.”19 Roosevelt conflated the two documents 
as a unified vision for the world, one meant to create a lasting peace, shaped by the United 
States. The freedoms outlined in both were the foundation for a post-war system Roosevelt 
personally believed in.  
With the ‘Four  Freedoms’  and  Atlantic  Charter,  Roosevelt  was  pushing  against  American  
opinion public out of a belief in internationalism as necessary for the future and for American 
victory in the Second World War. While Roosevelt wanted to see his ideals become reality, and 
believed  he  could  attain  them  in  his  lifetime,  the  path  was  difficult.  In  1942,  Roosevelt’s  progress  
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suffered a setback. Less than a year after the official formation of the United Nations as an 
alliance against the Axis powers, Roosevelt and the Democratic Party lost the midterms. Wendell 
Willkie, the Republican nominee in 1940, had even pushed his party to become more 
internationalist, but in the end the isolationists largely held their seats in the House of 
Representatives and Senate in the 1942 election. But, the results also showed Republicans would 
be open to internationalist policy. Thomas Dewey, who would face Roosevelt in the presidential 
election two years later, was elected to the Governorship of New York alongside a class of 
Republican internationalists,  spreading  the  influence  of    Roosevelt’s  new  future  across  party  
lines.20 
Although the League of Nations technically still existed, there was little appetite to return 
to that failed institution, particularly since the Soviet Union had been expelled from the 
organization and the United States had never joined. Starting with the conference at Dumbarton 
Oaks, and later at Yalta, Roosevelt and his advisors began to put his vision into action, laying the 
foundation for the United Nations. The first steps were taken by Hull prior to the Dumbarton 
Oaks Conference. Hull, through a group of Republican and Democratic party leaders that he was 
advising on the administration's foreign policy, got both parties to place a commitment to a post-
war international institution as part of their respective party platforms.21 Hull’s  goal  was  to  
remove  from  debate  the  future  of  foreign  policy  by  forcing  the  both  parties’  leaders  to  publicly  
state their support. Even as the conference continued into late summer and early winter, Hull still 
kept  the  party  leaders  informed  in  order  to  ensure  their  support  for  Roosevelt’s  vision.   
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Before the conference began in late August, each of the powers sent their proposed 
charters for study. With Soviet and Chinese tensions high, Stalin refused to allow all four 
nations—the United States, Soviet Union, China, and Great Britain—to meet at the same time, 
splitting the conference into two phases; one without China and one without the USSR. 
Undersecretary of State Edward Stettinius was chosen to lead the American delegation at 
Dumbarton  Oaks.  Stettinius  was  a  personal  favorite  of  Hull  in  part  because  of  “his  belief  in  the  
principles  and  policies  President  Roosevelt  and  I  were  supporting.”22 He was not a politician and 
instead was seen as a true believer in Roosevelt's vision of a postwar world. He constantly 
conferred with Hull and Roosevelt after each day of the conference, developing a deeper 
connection with the President and his vision. By the time of the conference Hull and Roosevelt 
had already convinced the Soviets to put the economic and social role for the UN on the 
discussion table. Previously the Soviet Union considered an organization solely for peacekeeping 
military purposes, but the two were able to convince the Soviets that the future did not need 
merely military security, but financial and social support as well.23 Heading into the conference 
everything  was  on  the  table.  Roosevelt,  via  Stettinius’  wholehearted  belief  in  his  vision,  had  the  
opportunity to start from anywhere with this new institution and shape it to his ideal. While 
initially the three major powers seemed in agreement based on the draft charters they sent one 
another,  the  conference  would  test  Stettinius’,  and  thus  Roosevelt’s,  ability  to  keep  both  the  
British and Soviets on the path to a stable, international, peace. 
 By the time the conference came to a close it had taken almost two months to establish a 
framework for the United Nations, with many of the more difficult issues being left for the 
leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union to address personally at Yalta. 
 
22 Hull, 1256. 
23 Hull, 1673. 
Dwyer 19 
   
 
Early in the conference the first of two impasses emerged. Andrei Gromyko, Soviet ambassador 
to the United States, requested that all 16 Soviet Republics be considered original members of 
the United Nations and have the same voting rights as any other state.24 Stettinius and British 
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Alexander Cadogan, the British representative to the 
conference, were shocked at the demand. Gromyko and the Soviet leaders were extremely 
concerned that the Soviet Union could be pushed out of decision making without the extra votes, 
fearful that Great Britain, with the support of her dominions, and the United States with the 
support of the Latin American republics would be able to ignore the Soviet Union. The evening 
after  the  Soviet  demand  was  made  Stettinius  recounts  in  his  diary  that,  “The  president  said,  ‘my  
God,’  and  went  on  to  instruct  me  to  explain  to  Gromyko  privately  and  personally  and  
immediately that we could never accept this proposal. He said to tell the ambassador this might 
ruin the chance of getting an international organization approved by the United States Senate and 
accepted publicly in  this  country.”25  
The press had been kept out of the conference out of a belief that it would hinder the 
diplomats' work to be under public scrutiny. The concern that knowledge of the Soviet request 
could kill the United Nations with the American public was so strong that the State Department 
referred to it as the  “x-matter”  in  all  documents  to  be  doubly  sure  it  did  not  leak.  Secretary  Hull  
went and spoke with Gromyko in an effort to convince him that the larger nations would not 
need extra votes, given they would have the military and economic power to be heard.26 Hull’s  
effort to convince the Soviets to drop the issue failed, leaving the issue in limbo for the 
remainder of the conference. All parties involved agreed to focus on other issues until everything 
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else was addressed, but this only meant the second impasse of the conference could rise to the 
fore instead. 
 The second stumbling block for the Dumbarton Oaks Conference was the veto. Roosevelt 
felt that the nations with a veto on the Security Council should be forbidden from using it on a 
matter that concerned their interests. Great Britain felt similarly but less strongly, however the 
Soviet Union was again worried that without a veto in any possible situation other powers could 
outvote the country for their own gain. The conference again could not move forward, 
Roosevelt’s  disagreement  on  the  veto  was  just  as  fundamental  as  16  extra  Soviet  votes.  After  
another unproductive meeting Stettinius attempted to force a resolution with Cadogan and 
Gromyko.  Cadogan  was  despondent,  stating  that  Great  Britain,  “would not attend a general 
conference [on the United Nations] until the four powers participating at Dumbarton Oaks were 
in  full  agreement  on  all  basic  issues.”27 This stance put the whole idea of the UN on hold until 
something changed in the Soviet position. Stettinius then went to challenge Gromyko reiterating 
that,  as  with  extra  Soviet  votes,  the  Soviet’s  view  of  the  veto  could  kill  American  public  support  
of an international organization, even mentioning that the smaller nations would see it as a threat 
to their independence.28 Gromyko  still  refused  to  budge,  retorting,  “You  can’t  have  an  
international  organization  without  us.  We  can’t  have  one  without  you.”29 Thus, putting an end to 
the hope of a swift resolution to the veto issue. With the British and Americans on one end and 
the Soviets on the other, neither was willing to change their position and the problems were 
postponed to Yalta instead. It would be for Roosevelt personally to save the United Nations from 
what he saw as two deadly demands by the Soviet Union.  
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Although Dumbarton Oaks did not address every issue brought forward, 1944 was still a 
resounding success for the future of the United Nations. The conference established the 
fundamental framework for the organization, a scope including economic and social branches, 
alongside the voting structure for the General Assembly, and the limits of the Security Council 
on all issues except the veto. The agreement, while revised at Yalta on the issues of Soviet votes 
and the veto, became the basis for the San  Francisco  Conference  in  April  of  1945.  Hull’s  efforts  
to remove the issue of a future international organization from the 1944 election were similarly 
successful. While Republican presidential nominee Thomas Dewey did object to the lack of 
representation for smaller nations at Dumbarton Oaks, Hull consulted with John Foster Dulles, 
Dewey’s  foreign  policy  advisor  during  the  campaign,  to  lay  out  the  role  for  smaller  nations  
within the greater framework. Dewey then left the issue alone for the remainder of the election.30 
In the 1944 election Roosevelt won an electoral college landslide, with Democrats gaining over 
30 seats in the House and internationalist senators in both parties defeating isolationists. It was a 
clear mandate for American participation in the future world organization, popular will was 
turning and Roosevelt had the support he needed to ensure his vision, if he could save it from the 
Soviet demands at Yalta.31 
 In February 1945, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt met for what would be the last time. 
The conference would resolve the issues surrounding the future United Nations and World War 
II  as  best  it  could.  Heading  into  the  conference  Roosevelt  had  two  main  objectives:  “the  speedy  
and unconditional surrender of the Axis powers . . . [and] the establishment of a world 
organization  for  peace  and  security.”32 While difficulties followed Yalta, without the conference 
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the United Nations would have never made it to San Francisco. Both issues of the extra Soviet 
votes and use of the veto were resolved with relative ease after Roosevelt and Stalin spoke face 
to face. Roosevelt and Stalin compromised at Yalta. Stalin had no illusions that the many Soviet 
states he claimed to be independent were not, it was simply a method of canceling out American 
and British influence in the rest of the globe.33 Roosevelt agreed to add two Soviet republics, 
instead of all 16, mitigating the damage to the institution's image in America while still giving 
Stalin something. With the atomic bomb not fully developed, the United States was still counting 
on Soviet support against Japan. Even though Roosevelt was committed to a post-war 
organization, making it through the war was the first priority.34 Similarly, the end result of the 
Security Council veto, was also a compromise. While the powers could not veto a discussion or 
resolution being put forth, they could veto the final action of the Security Council, which 
provided the check Stalin desperately wanted.  
While both of the road blocks from Dumbarton Oaks had been addressed, the agreement 
at  Yalta  was  not  perfect.  Roosevelt’s  small  compromises  for  the  sake  of  the  United  Nations  
ended with a larger one, leaving Poland to fall under Soviet control. Although the Russians 
committed to allow free elections there, Roosevelt had no leverage on the issue, thus he could 
not push Stalin, and Stalin could stand his ground on it. Roosevelt acknowledged the agreement 
was not perfect, simply the best he could do.35 By the Yalta Conference, Stettinius had been 
made Secretary of State due to  Hull’s  failing  health.  He  attended  the  conference  with  Roosevelt  
and  continued  his  role  as  the  chief  negotiator  on  the  United  Nations,  helping  make  Roosevelt’s  
vision, which he shared, into reality. In 1949, the year of his death, Stettinius published a book 
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on  Roosevelt’s  time  at  Yalta  in  which  he  commented,  “From  my  close  association  with  Franklin  
D. Roosevelt, I know that he was primarily motivated by the great ideal of friendly co-operation 
among nations . . . . he knew that winning of Russian confidence in a world organization would 
be difficult, and would take time and patience, peace was too vital a necessity not to make a 
supreme  effort  toward  achieving  this  goal.”36  
As Roosevelt returned to the United States he went to his home in Warm Springs, 
Georgia to rest and prepare for the San Francisco Conference to found the United Nations. He 
died there on April 12th, 1945, leaving the culmination of his vision in San Francisco in the 
hands of Harry Truman. While he promised to continue Roosevelt's  vision,  Truman’s  treatment  
of the UN and significant shift in American foreign policy stifled the organization before it had a 
chance to become what Franklin Delano Roosevelt had set out over the previous five years, and 
had believed in for decades before. 
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Section II. Truman Takes Over 
Truman’s  nomination  to  the  vice  presidency  in  1944  was  a  surprise,  both  to  himself  and  
to  many  within  the  Democratic  party.  Henry  Wallace,  Roosevelt’s  second  vice  president,  was  out  
of favor with the more conservative wing of the Democratic Party. Wallace was to the left of 
much of the party and strongly supported by labor unions. That, alongside his support for 
desegregation, and the general fear that Roosevelt could die during his fourth term caused 
Southern Democrats to push for someone else on the party ticket. Roosevelt acquiesced and 
stated he would accept either Harry Truman or William Douglas, a justice on the Supreme Court. 
The convention itself was a mess. James Byrnes, then Director of the Office of War 
Mobilization, was upset that he had been passed over in favor of Truman and sought to be 
nominated as well. Similarly, Henry Wallace attempted to fight for the nomination and put 
himself forward as a candidate. Further complicating the affair was a letter sent by Roosevelt to 
Henry Wallace stating that if the president was a delegate at the convention he would support 
Wallace, a statement that only increased confusion about Roosevelt's wishes.37 Although Truman 
was nominated in the end, the chaos surrounding the process was indicative of the political 
nature of his selection. Truman, from his first step into the Roosevelt administration was not an 
ideological  choice,  but  a  political  one,  and  his  worldview  never  fully  aligned  with  Roosevelt’s.   
As vice president,  Truman’s  role  within  the  Roosevelt  administration  was  in  support  of  a  
one-man presidency. Roosevelt consistently made decisions without consulting advisors in the 
State Department or other war-time departments. Instead he sent aides, such as Harry Hopkins, 
to  meet  with  leaders  and  enact  policies,  through  informal  channels.  Truman’s  role  was  largely  
overseeing the Senate, as is the official job of the vice president, and little else. While he did 
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attend Cabinet meetings, seldom was anything decided there as Roosevelt preferred individual 
conferences with advisors.38 In part because of the Yalta Conference, and compounded by 
Roosevelt’s  failing  health,  Truman  and  Roosevelt  did  not  spend  great  amounts  of  time  together.  
Consequently he was unaware of much  of  the  federal  government’s  efforts  concerning  the  war  
and foreign policy. Truman was thus in the extremely difficult position of a man lacking 
information upon his ascension to the presidency. Having been vice president for under three 
months it fell to Truman to continue an administration he knew little about. Truman thus began a 
balancing act between claiming the legacy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt on one side, and his 
own visions for American domestic and foreign policy on the other.  
 Truman and Roosevelt’s  presidential  styles  were  bound  to  be  different.  In  his  memoirs  
Truman comments that Roosevelt was a president focused on ideas and a vision of the world, but 
lacking in administering these plans.39 Conversely,  Truman’s  experience  was  based  around the 
logistics of passing legislation in the Senate, from both his time as vice president and a senator. 
Despite these general differences in style, Truman, on the night he was sworn in stated that it 
was  his  intention,  “to  continue  both  the  foreign  and  domestic policies of the Roosevelt 
administration.”40 However,  he  immediately  followed  this  statement  by  saying,  “I  made  it  clear,  
however,  that  I  would  be  President  in  my  own  right  .  .  .  .”  in  abrupt  contrast  to  his  previous  
statement.41 However, Congress was  not  sure  what  type  of  ‘President  in  his  own  right’  Truman  
would be. Some members were concerned that Truman would be more internationalist than 
Roosevelt, others were concerned that he would become an isolationist. While Truman was on 
the internationalist  side,  as  he  notes  in  his  memoir  after  observing  congress’s  concerns  about  his  
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positions, he was also out of his depth on foreign policy and lacked a record on such issues, 
making  congress’s  confusion  understandable.42 Truman’s  wartime  experience  in  the Senate was 
focused on the domestic side of the war effort. He led the Truman Committee, established to 
investigate corruption in defense contracts. While the effort greatly improved his image, it was 
not the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or involved in diplomatic decision making.43 
Truman needed to be brought up to speed concerning the war effort and foreign policy in 
his first days in office. This largely fell to Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, from a foreign 
policy perspective, and Secretary of War Henry Stimson, regarding the atomic bomb and broader 
war plans. Stettinius provided Truman with a document outlining the State Departments views 
on United States relations with other states, focused on those involved in the United Nations at 
the San Francisco Conference, but including all other topics considered important to foreign 
policy.44 Stimson met with Truman in the following days and informed him about the Manhattan 
Project and the general status of the war.45 While Truman was still learning the existing 
commitments  of  the  United  States’  foreign  policy,  and  having  just  promised  to  continue  
Roosevelt’s  policies,  he  began  to  make  changes  to  the  government. 
When later writing his memoirs Truman mused that even on his first day in office he 
knew he was going to make changes.46 The  first  of  many  was  Truman’s  desire  to  replace  
Secretary Stettinius with James Byrnes. Although policy disagreements pushed Stettinius and 
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Truman  apart  in  later  years,  it  was  not  the  goal  of  Truman’s  initial  plan.  Stettinius had never held 
elected office during his career, as a lifelong elected official this bothered Truman, particularly 
as without a vice president Stettinius was next in line for the presidency. He was also driven by a 
desire to make up with Byrnes, a career elected public official, following the rift at the 1944 
Democratic Convention.47 Truman made this decision on his first day in office, but did not 
inform Stettinius until the end of the San Francisco Conference months later. On the policy front, 
Truman was equally swift in making changes. While he made public pledges to uphold 
Roosevelt’s  agreement  with  the  Soviet  Union,  specialists  in  Soviet  affairs  began  arguing  for  a  
change  in  relations  towards  the  country.  They  were  less  optimistic  about  Stalin’s  cooperation 
moving forward, and concerned about relying on the Soviet Union in a war with Japan 
imperiling  the  United  States’  position  in  Asia.48 As Gar Alperovitz argues in his book Atomic 
Diplomacy Truman  was  quickly  making  changes,  “By  the  third  week  of  April 1945 he [Truman] 
and  most  of  his  senior  advisors  had  agreed  that  Roosevelt’s  policy  of  ‘cooperation’  [toward  the  
Soviet Union] had to be reconsidered and that it would now be a wise strategy to face the 
Russians with a firm negotiating position and strong  language.”49 
 These policy changes came within weeks of Truman ascending to a job he was not 
prepared  to  hold,  reversing  his  intention  to  continue  Roosevelt’s  policies.  While  campaigning  in  
support of President Roosevelt in the 1944 general election with regards to the coming 
challenges of ending the Second World War Truman stated that, 
Even in peacetime it is well recognized that it takes a new President at least a year to 
learn the fundamentals of his job. / We cannot expect any man wholly inexperienced 
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in national and international affairs to readily learn the view, the objectives and the 
inner thoughts of such divergent personalities as those dominant leaders who have 
guided the destinies of our courageous allies. There will be no time to learn, and 
mistakes once made cannot be unmade.50 
Truman acknowledges the irony of his comments about Governor Dewey in his memoirs 
applying to himself; nevertheless, whether referring to Governor Dewey or Vice President 
Truman the sentiment was still true. President Truman was inexperienced in international affairs, 
having been on the job only three weeks, and yet was changing US foreign policy, in opposition 
to his prior commitment to enact Roosevelt's vision. While inevitably a different president results 
in different policies, Truman was not walking the path Roosevelt had cleared; instead he was 
claiming  Roosevelt’s  legacy  in  order  to  enact  his  own  vision. 
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Section III. San Francisco 
 The San Francisco Conference was the successor to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference just 
under  a  year  before.  However,  unlike  Dumbarton  Oaks,  which  only  included  the  “major  powers”  
(The United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China), the San Francisco Conference 
included all existing members of the United Nations that joined in defeating Nazi Germany. The 
hope was to finalize the charter begun by the four major powers at Dumbarton Oaks and send it 
for ratification among the member states to officially create the United Nations. President 
Truman addressed the opening of the conference via wire from the White House, proclaiming his 
faith  in  the  delegation  appointed  by  Roosevelt  to  represent  the  United  States  and  that,  “You  
members of this Conference are to be the architects of the better world. In your hands rests our 
future. By your labors . . . we shall know if suffering humanity is to achieve a just and lasting 
peace.”51  
 Secretary Stettinius arrived at his position after filling multiple and disparate roles within 
the Roosevelt administration. Beginning life as a businessman, he was first on the War 
Production Board (1940-1941) then in the Office of Production Management (1941-1942), then 
became the administrator in charge of the Lend-Lease Program (1942-1943) and later an Under-
Secretary of State (1943-1944). At the State Department his initial main role was to reorganize 
the department into a more efficient institution, and improve its image amongst the United States 
public by doing interviews and public service films about its function. Stettinius was then named 
head of the United States delegation at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and later Yalta. After 
Secretary  of  State  Cordell  Hull’s  worsening  health  forced  him  to  resign,  Stettinius  was  swiftly  
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selected to replace him in late November of 1944.52 At first glance Stettinius is an odd choice, as 
a non-politician and public servant for less than five years, to replace Hull, the secretary for over 
a decade and a politician for decades more. However, for Roosevelt, Stettinius appeared a 
desirable choice because of his lack of political connections. As Walter Johnson argues in 
Norman  Graebner’s  collection  on  Secretaries  of  State,  “Since  Roosevelt  was  advocating  
American entrance into a world organization as a non-partisan issue, Republican opposition to a 
Democrat could have precipitated a fight like that of 1919-1920  over  the  League  of  Nations.”53 
Roosevelt’s  support  of  Stettinius  extended  beyond  political  calculus  and  Stettinius  was  
personally  liked  by  the  president.  Upon  learning  of  Roosevelt’s  death  Stettinius  later  recalled, 
“that  I  had  lost  one  of  the  best  and  closest  friends  I  had  ever  had  in  the  world.”54 Roosevelt 
frequently made his own foreign policy, acting without the State Department, and while he 
continued to do so in many areas the United Nations was an exception with Roosevelt accepting 
the  Department’s  recommendations  in  their  entirety.55 Stettinius and Roosevelt enjoyed a very 
close working relationship, particularly concerning the United Nations, both sharing an 
expansive vision of what the organization could do moving forward. But, with his mentor 
throughout all his public service gone, Stettinius was left alone to carry their original vision for 
the United Nations. 
Following his role at Dumbarton Oaks, and as the now Secretary of State, Stettinius was 
the  clear  choice  to  lead  the  United  States’  delegation  at  the  San  Francisco  Conference.  In  the 
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same vein he represented continuity between President Roosevelt and President Truman, 
ensuring stability in the near term, even if Truman wanted to make changes going forward. 
Removing the Secretary of State most experienced with the United Nations two weeks before the 
final conference would have sent the entire project into disarray and significantly weakened an 
already  difficult  United  States’  position  in  negotiating  with  a  semi-colonialist Great Britain and 
communist Soviet Union.  
 Within five days of Roosevelt’s  death  rumors  began  to  circulate  that  Stettinius  was  to  be  
replaced, not only in the long run but possibly even before the San Francisco Conference. On 
April 16th, 1945, Senator Tom Connally, a member of the United States delegation to the San 
Francisco Conference, called and told him that if James Byrnes came to the conference their 
actions would be discredited. Stettinius responded he would immediately speak with Truman 
about the topic.56 Stettinius and Byrnes did not have a particular animosity toward one another, 
but Roosevelt had passed over Byrnes for Stettinius when Cordell Hull resigned, desiring 
someone,  “who  could  work  harmoniously  with  him  .  .  .  [thus]  he  had  discarded  James  F.  Byrnes  
as  a  possibility.”57 As Truman would discover later in his presidency, Byrnes would act without 
direction, implementing policy without full consultation with the president. Although Truman 
reassured Stettinius he was not sending Byrnes to San Francisco, the rumors surrounding 
Stettinius’  replacement  continued throughout the entire conference, and while he still dedicated 
himself to the task of negotiating the United Nations Charter he questioned his standing within 
the new administration throughout the process. 
 Throughout the conference Secretary Stettinius sent frequent reports to President Truman 
outlining the negotiations and meetings that had taken place that day. The San Francisco 
 
56 Stettinius, Diaries of Stettinius, 322. 
57 Graebner, 215. 
Dwyer 32 
   
 
Conference resulted in increased tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union in 
particular. The debate surrounding the veto, which had been settled between Roosevelt and 
Stalin at Yalta returned. The Soviet Union once again argued that the veto should be allowed on 
all issues before the Security Council, including any discussion or debate. Eventually, Truman 
sent Harry Hopkins to meet personally with Joseph Stalin. Hopkins and Stalin knew each other 
well  from  Hopkins’  close  relationship  with  Roosevelt,  and  as  administrator  of  the  Lend-Lease 
program on which the Soviet Union relied. The veto was thus resolved with Stalin ordering 
Gromyko to back down, but not without weeks of negotiation and frustration.  
The San Francisco Conference finally concluded on June 26th, 1945 with the signing of 
the United Nations Charter by all 50 participating nations. Five days prior, Stettinius learned 
from  President  Truman’s  aide  George  Allen  that  the  president  did  intend  to  replace  him  with  
James Byrnes and offer Stettinius the role of US Ambassador to the UN instead. Stettinius 
responded that he was open to taking the position but was growing weary of public life.58 The 
night before the signing of the UN Charter Stettinius and Truman talked privately. Truman 
informed Stettinius that he intended to replace him with James Byrnes and offered him the role 
of United States representative to the United Nations. Stettinius was wary of accepting the role. 
His relationship with Byrnes had grown tense and he was concerned the change would be seen as 
a  demotion;;  similarly  he  was  unwilling  to  commit  to  remain  until  the  end  of  Truman’s  term,  
instead stating he would only stay until the organization was on its feet. Truman accepted 
Stettinius’  terms  and  told  him  that  he  truly  believed  it  could  be  presented  in  such  a  way  that  it  
would  not  be  a  public  “‘kick  in  the  pants’”  for  Stettinius.59 Regardless of the internal 
administration politics Stettinius was the most logical choice for the position and he expected to 
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remain  in  the  inner  circle  of  foreign  policy  within  the  Truman  administration.  In  Truman’s  
words,  “There  are  only  two  people  in  the  country  for this job –– you  and  Mr.  Hull,  and  he  can’t  
do it. You know all the international personalities and circumstances from Dumbarton Oaks on 
as  no  other  American.”60 
By the end of July the Senate had ratified the UN Charter. With ratifications in 29 nations 
the United Nations came into being on October 24th, 1945, finally concluding the years of 
negotiations. However, while tensions between the member states of the United Nations had 
been resolved over the preceding few months, those between now-former Secretary of State 
Stettinius and President Truman were experiencing a revival.  
As 1946 began Stettinius grew more and more disillusioned with President Truman and 
Secretary Byrnes. In February 1946 one of the first crises to be handled by the United Nations 
broke out, when Soviet troops refused to leave Iran as those of the United States and Great 
Britain had done in order to return control of the country to the Iranians. Early in the crisis 
Stettinius was on vacation for two weeks, and during that time Truman made two appointments 
to the American UN staff without consulting Stettinius, something he had promised to do weeks 
earlier.61 In addition the new appointments would report to Byrnes, not Stettinius, even though 
they were under the US delegation to the UN, not outside positions. Upon his return in mid-
March Stettinius went to Byrnes and learned this information. At the same meeting Stettinius 
also learned that Byrnes, rather than himself, would address the UN concerning the United States 
position on the crisis, further frustrating Stettinius.62 On May 30th, as the crisis was winding 
down, with Soviet troops departing Iran, Stettinius submitted his letter of resignation to Truman. 
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Stettinius felt that Truman was unwilling to put the United Nations at the center of his foreign 
policy (the approach that Stettinius favored), and he was convinced that if the US did not provide 
the organization with leadership its chances of success were low.63 Having expressed this view to 
Truman, and still experiencing a lack of the support Truman had promised when Stettinius first 
took the position, combined with the slights caused by a larger role for Byrnes and the 
appointments made without his consultation, Stettinius sent the letter.64 
In a press conference the next day Truman stated  he  had  not  expected  Stettinius’  
resignation and that both he and Secretary Byrnes wished for him to stay. Both statements were 
true, even after the tensions between the three men.65 On June 4th Stettinius met in person with 
Byrnes and told him that he,  “felt  it  was  best  for  him  [Byrnes]  and  best  for  the  United  Nations  
and best for me [Stettinius] that he make a change, that I did not feel that I was on the inner 
circle, so to speak, and being a part of the policy-making group, and that I had done what I had 
promised  Truman  to  do”66 Later that day Stettinius spoke to Truman with Byrnes and conveyed 
the same message. Truman was unhappy at the news and attempted to convince Stettinius to 
remain, but failed. Stettinius took this final opportunity to articulate his belief in the UN, that, 
“unless  the  driving  leadership  is  continued  by  the  United  States  .  .  .  the  United  Nations  is  not  
going  to  be  successful.”67 Stettinius was unable to convey the importance of American leadership 
at the United Nations, and Truman became more and more committed to going around the 
organization to achieve his goals.  
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After  Stettinius’  departure,  some  of  Roosevelt’s  advisors,  such  as James Byrnes and Dean 
Acheson remained in government, but by this time any who remained were squarely aligned with 
Truman’s  more  confrontational  foreign  policy  towards  the  Soviet  Union  and  a  lack  of  focus  on  
the UN. The future of the world organization envisioned by Roosevelt was squarely in the hands 
of Truman. Stettinius had been ambassador to the United Nations for under a year, however his 
impact on the creation of the organization was vast. From his presence at Yalta, Dumbarton 
Oaks, and San Francisco,  Stettinius  shared  Roosevelt’s  vision  for  a  world  organization,  and  gave  
life  to  the  idea.  After  Roosevelt's  death,  Stettinius’  loyalty  to  the  ideal  and  the  man,  ‘provided  
him with the drive and energy to carry through at San Francisco after his mentor had died and 
after he knew Soviet leaders were willing always to treat idealism such as his with cynicism and 
disdain.”68 Stettinius’  departure  signified  the  end  of  the  time  of  idealism  surrounding  the  United  
Nations,  by  the  end  of  1946  the  institution’s  fate would be sealed, it was a stage for the coming 
Cold War, not one for world peace.  
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Section  IV.  Truman’s  Foreign  Policy 
The United Nations was established. The organization would not falter before its Charter 
could be signed, but it could still be ignored.  Truman’s  foreign  policy  and  attitude  to  the  
organization over the nearly two terms of his presidency turned the United Nations into an 
afterthought in decision making. While Stalin and the Soviet Union certainly helped the 
organization falter, creating domestic and international pressures on the United States to respond 
which Truman could not ignore, Truman consistently turned the US, which had initially put forth 
the  United  Nations’  ideal,  away  from  the  organization  in  major  decisions.  With  the  
announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the formation of the North American Treaty 
Organization in 1949, and the beginning of the Korean War in 1950 Truman sidestepped the 
United Nations in each instance, using the UN as a stage and a stamp, instead of as an 
international organization created to solve global problems. Pulled together these three events set 
the tone for the United Nations moving forward. 
 After  Roosevelt’s  death  Truman  proclaimed  he  was  following  Roosevelt’s  legacy,  but  
instead his foreign policy took on a confrontational, and unilateral, role toward the Soviet Union 
and  was,  “less  internationalist  than  nationalistic.”69 He would be an activist, not an 
internationalist, president, abandoning the balance Roosevelt had curated over his presidency. 
This shift to a more confrontational role began as soon as Truman was in office. Before the San 
Francisco Conference Truman berated Foreign Minister Molotov in the Oval Office about 
Poland and the Yalta agreements, so much so that then Army Chief of Staff George Marshall and 
other members of the cabinet were concerned Stalin would not join the war against Japan.70 
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While the atomic bomb later removed the need for significant Soviet support, it also helped push 
Truman into becoming more confrontational with the Soviet Union. Instead of following 
Roosevelt,  Truman  relied  on,  “military  strength,  not  the  development  of  mutual  trust  of  a  policy  
based  on  accommodation.”71 Secretary of State James Byrnes, under pressure from Truman and 
Republicans outside the administration to be more confrontational with the Soviet Union, gave a 
speech on February 28th, 1946 giving a public voice to the administration's stance.72 In it Byrnes 
praises  the  Soviet  Union,  stating,  “Only  an  inexcusable  tragedy  of  errors could cause serious 
conflict  between  us  in  the  future.”73 However in the next paragraph Byrnes promises the United 
States will defend the UN Charter o if it comes under threat, implying the Soviet Union was the 
threat, further raising tensions  
 While the hardened anti-Soviet stance was spreading, Secretary of Commerce Henry 
Wallace was still one of the few dissenters within the administration, and Wallace expressed his 
dissent within the administration. He sent Truman memos on foreign policy, used to a greater 
degree  of  latitude  as  Roosevelt’s  vice  president.  However  in  late  September  of  1946  he  gave  a  
speech on foreign policy at Madison Square Garden, arguing for a friendly relationship with the 
Soviet Union. Truman saw the speech as an affront to his policy, and in opposition to what 
Byrnes  and  others  had  been  saying  for  months,  ‘catching  hell’  for  it  as  he  wrote  in  his  diary  from  
the press and within the administration. Within a week Truman asked Wallace to resign, stating 
“Well  now  he’s  out  and  the  crackpots  are  having  conniption  fits.  I’m  glad  they  are.  It  convinces  
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me  I’m  right.”74 Those  who  did  not  support  Truman’s  antagonistic  and  confrontational  tone  
towards  the  Soviet  Union  were  considered  insane.  Truman  believed  that  only  the  ‘crackpots’  
could disagree with his new policy and that they had reinforced his belief. The Democratic Party 
was  to  be  one  of  ‘cold  warriors’.  Wallace  and  the  ‘crackpots’  were  no  longer  in  the  party  Truman  
envisioned, and seemingly neither was anyone associated with the Roosevelt administration. 
With  Wallace  gone,  Secretary  of  Defense  Forrestal  was  the  only  member  of  Roosevelt’s  cabinet  
still within the Truman administration, though he would depart before the next election. The 
Truman administration had been remade, and those who publicly dissented with the new 
confrontational policy were pushed out. By 1946 the Truman Doctrine was forming and 
confrontation and containment, was the official policy, whether or not it accorded with the 
United Nations ideal. 
 In February of 1946  Stalin  released  the  Soviet  Union’s  next  five-year plan, calling for an 
expanded Soviet military. This was taken by those in the United States as a threat against them in 
Truman’s  confrontational  paradigm.  Later  that  month  George  Kennan,  then  stationed  in the State 
Department  in  Moscow,  sent  the  Truman  administration  the  ‘Long  Telegram’  outlining  the  
Soviet  Union’s  intention  as  he  saw  them.  The  telegram,  “crystali[z]ed the changing attitude of 
the  administration”  with  Kennan  regarding  any  hope  for  American collaboration with Stalin as a 
“pipe  dream.”75 Kennan argued that Soviet participation in the UN was dependent on what they 
could get out of it, thus it necessitated a defense by the United States to protect the organization 
that  represented  “our  way  of  thinking.”76 His solution to the problem was one of confrontation 
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that Truman had already been supporting, however not confrontation within the UN framework 
as intended, but outside it. Kennan states that the Soviet Union only responds to force, not logic. 
“For  this  reason  it  can  easily  withdraw–and usually does– when strong resistance is encountered 
at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it he 
rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-ending 
showdowns.”77 Kennan put into words the policy already developing, force was the way to deal 
with the Soviet Union and so the United Nations no longer had a purpose. It was a stage to 
threaten on as Byrnes would do when Soviet troops were in Iran later that year, but never the 
means to the solution of a world crisis.  
 While internally Truman was moving towards a forceful confrontation with the Soviet 
Union the public side of the policy did not shine through until the Truman Doctrine. In August of 
1946 the Soviet Union put forward a plan to jointly guard the Dardanelle Straits with Turkey. 
Truman and Dean Acheson, his closest foreign policy advisor with Byrnes or George Marshall 
often away from Washington, were surprised by the suggestion, seeing it as a possible route for 
communist expansion. They began considering aid to Greece and Turkey in order to box the 
Soviet Union out.78 Great Britain meanwhile had been supporting Greece monetarily for some 
time, but by March of 1947 the economic problems of rebuilding a destroyed Britain meant they 
could no longer support them. The British turned to the US asking Truman to take over, and 
providing him with the impetus for the Truman Doctrine. The Truman administration had no 
money to direct  to  Greece  and  Turkey  without  congressional  approval,  leading  to  Truman’s  
speech to Congress which became the Truman Doctrine. It outlined what he saw as the threat 
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posed  by  the  Soviet  Union  toward  Greece  and  Turkey,  and  why  it  was  the  United  States’  job to 
support  them  and  not  the  United  Nations’  to  offer  aid  or  address  the  issue.79 
The speech Truman gave was not solely his doing. Although Truman was very active in 
directing foreign policy, Dean Acheson played a large role. As Undersecretary of State during 
both Byrnes and Marshall's time as Secretary, Acheson frequently was Acting Secretary of State 
while they were away, standing in at countless White House meetings with Truman. In the case 
of the Truman Doctrine, while Truman himself edited the speech, the initial drafts came from 
Acheson and the State Department staff under him.80 On March 12th Truman appeared before a 
special session of Congress in order to deliver the speech, arguing that if the United States does 
not  respond  they  may,  “endanger  the  peace  of  the  world”81 Even in the speech Truman is aware 
of removing the United Nations from the issue, declaring that the UN is not in a position to help, 
without even consulting the organization beforehand. Instead it must be the United States that 
acts to  help  Greece  and  Turkey.  Truman  states  the  US  will,  “be  giving  effect  to  the  principles  of  
the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations”  thus  claiming  the  ideal  and  support  of  the  United  Nations’  
mission, but leaving the organization itself to the side.82 Truman uses  the  organization’s  name  as  
a stamp, instead of channeling the issue through it.  
By removing the UN from the crisis, he sets a precedent within his own administration 
that the United Nations is simply a figurehead for whatever the US wants to do. In closing the 
speech Truman shows that the policy put forth that day is not just for one situation, instead that, 
“it  must  be  the  policy  of  the  United  States  to  support  free  peoples  who  are  resisting  attempted  
 
79 Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, 277-279. 
80 Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, 281-282. 
81 Harry S.  Truman,  “Special  Message  to  Congress  on  Greece  and  Turkey:  The  Truman  Doctrine  March  12,  1947.”  
In The Public Papers of Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, 
Speeches, and Statements of the President, April 12, 1945 - January 20, 1953, vol. 3, ed. Warren R. Reid and 
Mildred B. Berry (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O 1963), 180. 
82 Truman, Public Papers of the President, 3:177, 179. 
Dwyer 41 
   
 
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”83 Truman places the United States as 
the primary response to aggression around the world, not the United Nations. This sentiment is 
not  specific  to  Greece  and  Turkey  in  1947,  but  all  situations  involving  ‘free  peoples’,  the  United  
States must confront those situations, without the organization intended to handle them.  
In  the  days  following  Truman’s  speech  himself  and  Acheson  moved  to  get  the  entire  
administration and Congress in line with the new official policy operating outside of the United 
Nations and on their own. Acheson went before Congress and argued that discussion with the 
Soviets was not an option, pushing for containment via supporting Greece and Turkey without 
using the word. As Robert Donovan says in his first book on the Truman administration,  “the  
Truman Doctrine lent a rigidity to foreign policy that for a generation inhibited a turn from the 
Cold  War.”84 Truman was locked in on the Cold War, and was set out to ensure his 
administration and those to come were as well, leaving the collective United Nations for the 
United  States’  own  individual  security  interests  instead.85 Support of the speech within the 
administration was almost unanimous, with one important exception: Eleanor Roosevelt.  
After Franklin D. Roosevelt's death, Eleanor Roosevelt disappeared from public life until 
coming  back  as  the  United  States’  representative  to  the  UN  Commission  on  Human  Rights  in  
April of 1946. Now within the Truman administration and a member of its delegation to the 
United Nations, she was often one of the only advocates for the organization. Upon hearing the 
Truman Doctrine, Eleanor Roosevelt complained, first to Acheson and later Truman himself, that 
it was going around the UN. She was similarly concerned that the military nature of the United 
States’  support  for  Greece  and  Turkey  was  going  to  be  an  unpopular  escalation  of  the  situation.  
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Eleanor’s  criticism  made  few  waves  in  the  administration,  and  unlike  Henry  Wallace  she  was  
unwilling to publicly criticize the administration over the issue. For Truman this was a lucky 
break, while Wallace was popular with the labor movement and left side of the Democratic 
party,  Eleanor  Roosevelt’s  word,  as  former  first-lady and now a representative to the 
organization Franklin D. Roosevelt envisioned (a vision that she shared), could have turned at 
least some members of the public against Truman's actions.86  
Although  it  was  not  public,  Eleanor’s  internal  criticism  illustrated  the  degree  to  which  
Truman was breaking with the United Nations. Going forward, he was determined to confront 
the Soviet Union, and to do that with unilateral force, rather than diplomacy. That force, seen in 
the  military  support  for  Greece  and  Turkey  promised  to  all  ‘free  people’  who  needed  it,  became  
even more explicit two years later when the United States signed a military treaty, something the 
United States had not done since the American Revolution. 
 Just  as  the  United  States  was  preparing  to  take  on  the  ‘Soviet  threat’  so  was  Western  
Europe. In March of 1948 Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, and Great Britain 
signed the Brussels Pact, forming a defensive agreement between the five countries. By April of 
the same year the US internally began showing interest in approaching the pact about a broader 
Atlantic agreement to confront the Soviet Union.87 While the US was the first to express interest 
in the treaty, it was also pushed by Europe. The fall of Czechoslovakia to communism in 
February 1948 and the Berlin Blockade in June of 1948 through May 1949, increased concern 
about the westward expansion of communism in Europe. The treaty took a significant political 
lift in the United States and France in particular. In the US Acheson worked to assuage 
congressional concerns that the United States would end up in war without congressional 
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approval, eventually getting Republican Senator Vandenberg on board, ensuring bipartisan 
support for the treaty even with the inclusion of Article Five, the mutual defense portion of the 
treaty. France meanwhile was incensed over the inclusion of Italy in the treaty, distrustful of the 
country's role in the Second World War, however American pressure on the importance of a 
Mediterranean presence, and needing to ensure Italy did not fall to communism, eventually 
achieved French support.88  
Domestically the treaty lived in a complicated place. At the same time the Truman 
administration was pushing a military aid package for many of the soon to be NATO members. 
By almost immediately following the Marshall Plan, there was concern that the new military aid, 
on top of NATO, would siphon money meant for peaceful reconstruction to the military 
instead.89  The NATO treaty was also seen as increasing tensions without benefit, since few 
thought the Soviet Union had immediate military desires for Western Europe, and the existence 
of Article 51 in the UN Charter, including the principles of self-defense and UN intervention, 
meant  that  the  treaty  was  ‘fixing’  a  working  system.90 NATO  formalized  the  United  States’  
military commitments in Western Europe. Having already sent billions of dollars to the region in 
the  Marshall  plan,  and  the  Truman  Doctrine’s  promise  of  protecting  all  ‘free  people’,  with  
American support the treaty was simply reinforcing the move to an independent American 
foreign policy. The Truman administration argued that NATO was just an extension of the self-
defense already included in the United Nations, but in creating it went around the original 
institution.91Although the treaty itself was supposedly in line with the UN according to Truman, 
it signified the United States moving farther and farther from the organization to implement any 
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policy. The protection of peace was further a military, rather than diplomatic affair. Truman set 
up the country to confront the Soviet Union, and any other crises that arose outside of the United 
Nations, thereby choosing a military alliance as the best system to ensure not peace, but the 
defeat of the Soviet Union.  
 The  United  States’  involvement  in  Korea  began  following  the  Second World War when 
the country was made a UN trusteeship. When Korea was conquered by the Japanese in 1910, it 
existed as one nation. However, just as Germany was split between the Soviet Union and the 
Western Allies, Korea was split between a Soviet north and American south. Containment had 
enveloped  American  policy  in  Europe,  so  too  did  it  in  Asia.  The  United  States’  strong  role  in  
supporting  the  nations  of  Japan,  the  Philippines,  and  Korea  lead  to  Truman’s  policy  of  
confrontation being laid out specifically toward Asia. In a January 1950 speech by Dean 
Acheson, now Secretary of State, to the National Press Club in Washington D.C., Acheson 
outlined  the  American  ‘defensive  perimeter’  in  Asia.  It  started  in  the  Aleutians  off  the  coast  of  
Alaska before continuing down to Japan, the Ryukyu islands, and the Philippines. Noticeably 
absent from the perimeter was Korea. While few took notice at the time, the omission led to an 
uproar when war broke out on the Korean peninsula in June. Unlike in Europe or with the 
Truman  Doctrine,  Acheson’s  speech  did  not  eliminate  the  UN  from  participation,  stating,  
“Should  such  an  [armed]  attack  occur  .  .  .  the  initial  reliance  must  be  upon  the  people  attacked  to  
resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the 
United  Nations”92 This left the door open for the UN to take a leading role in Asia or a possible 
crisis after closing it in Europe with the formation of NATO. But, the Truman Doctrine had 
already moved the administration away from  the  organization  and  Acheson’s  speech  did  nothing  
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material to stop the administration from sidelining the UN once war broke out, solidifying 
Truman’s  choices  to  remove  the  United  Nations  from  global  peace  in  favor  of  containing  
communism alone. 
 The Korean War began on June 25th. Truman, out of Washington at the time, flew back 
and immediately began meetings with Acheson and the cabinet on the developing crisis. The 
next day Truman committed both the air force and navy to support the South Korean army, 
moved the 7th Fleet between China and Taiwan, and provided aid to the Philippines and France 
in Vietnam. Within the span of 24 hours Truman was mobilizing the United States to support its 
‘defensive  perimeter’  in  Asia.  At  the  same  time  Truman  sent  General MacArthur to Korea in 
order to supervise American forces there and report back.93 On June 30th he added the army to 
the slate of forces operating in Korea, fully committing the US to the situation.94 In the meetings 
surrounding  the  United  States’  escalation Truman was positive about a role for the UN in Korea, 
but just as he had bypassed them with the Truman Doctrine in providing aid to Greece and 
Turkey, so did he in Korea.  
While there was a UN resolution on June 25 ordering North Korean troops to withdraw it 
did not authorize intervention in the country. Nevertheless, American forces were sent into South 
Korea before the June 27th UN resolution asking for military action in Korea. As such the 
Security  Council’s  decision  was,  “merely  a  retroactive  approval of a fait accompli”,  something  
that has already happened with no option but to accept it.95 In the meeting during which Truman 
decided to commit the military to Korea he went even further, telling Acheson if the United 
Nations did not go in, the US would alone, acting without any input from the organization at all. 
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As Donovan comments on the situation in his book, acting with the United Nations was not out 
of  the  importance  of  the  organization  but  for,  “the  advantage  of  sanctioning  whatever  military  
measures  the  United  States  might  decide  to  take  in  Korea.”96 By using the UN flag the United 
States could move without restraint. There was no need for consensus, the United States was 
now  the  embodiment  of  the  United  Nations’  will  and  thus  did  not  need  to  consult it in decision 
making. Of the nations that joined the United States in Korea, ten out of the fourteen were 
NATO members and supplied the vast majority of troops on the peninsula.97 The independent 
military organization that had been created was now being used to confront the Soviet Union, 
simply under the banner of the UN as cover. As the conflict progressed the military operations 
fell further under American control. American-led forces crossed the 38th parallel and headed 
into North Korea without UN approval, and in defiance of the organization's goal of returning to 
the old border. Yet, the United States received no reprimand.98 The Truman administration's 
takeover of foreign policy was complete, and the United States was free to act alone without the 
organization it helped create explicitly for this purpose just five years earlier. 
 The United States not only removed the UN from military considerations in Korea, but 
also  sought  to  remove  it  from  peace  negotiations.  Following  China’s  entrance  into  the  war after 
the United States went above the 38th parallel, other countries began trying to use the 
organization as it was intended: to negotiate peace. Led by India, the effort included offering 
Communist China a permanent seat on the Security Council, something the Nationalist 
government in exile still held. The United States refused, contending that the Security Council 
seat was a completely separate issue. After initially rebuffing this attempt India, along with Great 
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Britain, many European NATO allies, and American supported states in Asia and the Middle 
East tried again. China refused their terms but responded that it was the ceasefire while having 
any negotiation, which China believed would weaken their position, that was the issue. The 
member states who  pushed  for  these  terms  found  China’s  clarifications  acceptable  and  were  
ready to begin negotiating before the United States once again intervened. The US was unwilling 
to accept any negotiation terms that included the Security Council seat or a ceasefire during 
negotiations.99 Truman and his administration were willing to accept negotiations, just not on 
these terms. By including terms in each peace effort they now knew China would not accept, 
terms their own allies were not in favor of, Truman could continue confronting China without 
repercussions or the threat of peace on global, as opposed to American terms.100 
 While the United States got what it wanted it came at a cost. By going against many of 
their  NATO  allies  Truman’s  administration  had  to  fight  to hold the organization together moving 
forward, promising to increase their support for the organization in the process.101 The United 
States  maintained  a  form  of  unity  amongst  nation  members  but,  “at  the  cost  of  the  substance  of  
action.”102 Nothing was to be accomplished. Negotiations would not begin, the war would not 
end. Although domestic and congressional anti-communism pushed Truman to remain in the 
war, he rarely consulted Congress and largely ignored them in Korea. The United States would 
continue on the path set out when Truman became president; one of confrontation alone. While 
the war in Korea did not end until after Truman was out of office, the conflict cemented his 
administration's commitment to military confrontation. NATO received a new arms deal and the 
promise  of  an  additional  four  American  divisions,  bolstering  Truman’s  separate  system  of  
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confrontation in Europe.103 Truman’s  commitment  was  so  strong  that  he  and  Acheson  pushed  for  
and received a re-armament deal for Western Germany, one which was vehemently opposed by 
the  French.  At  the  same  time  the  United  States’  military  budget  tripled  from  1950  to  1951  from  
17 billion to 53 billion, indicating the massive monetary commitment Truman was able to secure 
for his position.104 However  the  expansion  of  Truman’s  confrontational  policies  was  not  solely  a  
result of the Korean War. While the conflict did help him pass expansive military proposals to 
expand the separate foreign policy system, the administration had already internally agreed upon 
their necessity. 
 National Security Council paper number 68 set the stage for what was to come, not only 
for Truman, but for the Cold War. Written in April of 1950 before the Korean War began the 
document declares that the United States must be prepared for the Cold war, and to do so on its 
own concluding, 
. . . we must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, 
economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative 
program intend to wrest the initiate from the Soviet Union, confront it with 
convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate 
Kremlin design of a world domination by its will . . . . / The whole success of the 
proposed program hangs ultimately on recognition by this Government, the 
American people, and all free peoples, that the cold war is in fact a real war in 
which the survival of the free world is at stake.105 
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The  ‘free  peoples’  having  been  those  who  were  established  in  the  Truman  Doctrine  as  the  United  
States’  to  protect,  were  in  need.  The  Truman  administration  believed  that  only  by  overwhelming  
mobilization and acceptance of the Cold War, and a need to confront it, would world domination 
be stopped. There was no other option, it was up to the United States to lead, without the United 
Nations, using the framework it had created in NATO and the Truman Doctrine, practiced in 
Korea, and expanded once again afterwards, to defeat communism. It was a mobilization of the 
United States, and the people the country was now meant to protect, not a mobilization of the 
United Nations, which would solve the coming crisis. The purpose of the UN in the coming 
crisis  was  to  confer,  “its  blessing  on  their  undertaking  .  .  .  allowing  the  United  States  and  her  
allies  to  justify  their  policy  in  terms  of  the  organization’s  global  symbols.”106 The United Nations 
was nothing but a stage for the United States, and the new framework Truman had created 
around it to confront global problems without consideration for the UN organization created to 
do so. 
 James  Byrnes,  in  his  speech  to  the  Overseas  Press  Corps  in  1946  stated,  “The  United  
Nations got off to a good start. However that does not mean it is an assured success. It simply 
means that the Charter will work if the peoples of the United Nations are determined to make it 
work.”107 The United States was not determined to make it work. Truman was determined to 
create his own structure, one that allowed for American leadership without questions, and 
confrontation  at  its  center.  Via  Roosevelt’s  efforts  to  make  his  vision  of  world  peace  in  the  
United Nations the organization got off to a good start. But Truman slowly and systematically 
pushed the organization to the side. Beginning with the Truman Doctrine in 1947 concluding  
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with  the  Korean  War  three  years  later,  Truman’s  decisions  eliminated  any  hope  for  the  
organization's good start to become an assured success, or a part of American foreign policy. 
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Section V. The Reaction 
Congressional support and public opinion usually operate in tandem. It is difficult to 
sustain  a  foreign  policy  for  a  long  period  of  time  without  both  on  one’s  side.  Over  the  course  of  
his presidency, Roosevelt slowly but steadily steered the American public, and politicians they 
elected, towards his balance of multilateral internationalism and support for his vision of the 
United Nations. While it required constantly cajoling senators such as Arthur Vandenberg, de-
facto leader of the Republican Party on foreign policy, Roosevelt was successful. Truman needed 
that same political and public support for his goals, and received it, while consistently making 
foreign policy decisions that would eventually exclude the UN. Although Truman received more 
criticism in Congress and the press than Roosevelt, both presidents were able to garner and 
maintain popular support for their respective foreign policies.  
 Roosevelt’s  path  in  many  ways  was  easier  than  Truman’s.  While  he  initially  struggled  to  
convince Congress and the public of the need for re-armament, the rising threat of Imperial Japan 
and Nazi Germany helped push Americans toward an international outlook, accepting an activist 
international policy but not yet a multilateral one. As Schuyler Foster notes in his book on the 
replacement  of  the  United  States’  isolationist  foreign  policy  with  an  activist  one,  “Pearl  Harbor  
evidently brought a national realization that, no matter how hard America tried to keep out of a 
major war, this aim could not succeed, and that we might  better  ‘take  an  active  part  in  world  
affairs’  in  the  hope  of  thereby  minimizing  our  involvement  in  war.”108 As a participant in the 
Second World War, the United States naturally was invested in its outcome, and interested in the 
prevention of war going forward. However, the US could not just return to the League of Nations 
it had never joined. Having failed to stop the current conflict, and with Roosevelt presiding over 
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a  complete  reversal  from  isolationism  to  internationalism,  “many  Americans  would  find it easier 
to support a new world organization than the ill-fated  League.”109 A fresh start with the United 
Nations also meant a fresh start for Roosevelt in convincing Congress and the public the 
organization was necessary. 
 Roosevelt’s  vision  took  a  back seat to winning the war until the 1944 election cycle. In 
the lead up to the presidential election, Cordell Hull began his own campaign. Hull spoke with 
the Senators of the Foreign Relations Committee in both parties, arguing the United Nations was 
too important to be left to chance. Eventually, Hull got both the Democratic and Republican 
party platforms to include the goal of an international organization, with American 
membership.110 While  some  of  Hull’s  success  can  be  attributed  to  him  personally,  by  1944 public 
support, and thus congressional support along with it, was at around 70% for an international 
organization with the United States as a member.111 The move by both parties to support the 
United Nations in 1944 foreshadowed the election itself. Roosevelt was re-elected for a fourth 
term  with  internationalists  in  both  parties  defeating  isolationists.  The  election,  “was  a  clear-cut 
mandate  for  American  participation  in  the  United  Nations.”112 The UN became a foregone 
conclusion, both in the minds of the American public and Congress.  
Although the parties and public mostly had united around the idea of an international 
organization, its specifics were still unknown to both. Roosevelt had outlined his vision for a 
post-war world in the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms speech, but the details of the plan 
were  still  kept  internal  to  the  administration.  Republican  senators,  even  during  the  ‘truce’  leading  
up to the 1944 election began pressing Roosevelt for details. Hull, at the same time as convincing 
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both the Democratic and Republican parties to commit to an international organization, also 
began convincing Republican senators of the organization Roosevelt envisioned. Vandenberg, as 
the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was seen as the leader on Republican 
foreign  policy  following  Dewey’s  defeat  in  1944.  Over  the  summer  Hull  worked  with  him,  
updating Vandenberg prior to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference on the administration's goals, and 
even giving him briefings during the conference. While initially wary of the United Nations 
superseding the Senate on foreign policy and possibly dragging the United States into war 
without congressional approval, Vandenberg, and all but two Republican senators, came to 
support the organization wholeheartedly by the time of a vote on the Charter.113 Hull’s  
substantial efforts at inclusiveness led directly to the overwhelming bipartisan support. 
Vandenberg went so far as to publicly praise Hull for the way he handled the Senate during the 
time.114 Roosevelt needed Vandenberg’s  support  so  much  that  he  became  a  member  of  the  
American delegation to the San Francisco Conference.  
After  the  1944  election,  Roosevelt’s  efforts  to  convince  the  public  and  Congress  to  
support his vision slowed. At Yalta his focus was getting Great Britain and the Soviet Union to 
support the UN. With his worsening health Roosevelt faded out of public life, retreating to Warm 
Springs in order to rest and prepare for San Francisco. His death, on April 12th, 1945, left behind 
a public and congressional consensus in support of the United Nations. However, it fell to 
Truman to sustain that consensus and see the vision through. Instead, Truman barely saw the 
consensus through San Francisco. He took the lesson regarding the importance of Vandenberg in 
leading  Senate  Republicans,  and  the  importance  of  the  idea  of  the  UN  as  Roosevelt’s  legacy,  and  
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used them to push Congress and the public towards a confrontational and unilateral foreign 
policy. 
 By the time of the San Francisco Conference, public support for the United Nations was 
just as high as before: still over 70%.115 However,  while  the  public’s  support  for  the  UN  
remained  after  Roosevelt’s  death,  Congress’  was  harder  to  come  by.  Truman  was  personally  
popular with the Congress; having spent years in the body prior to his ascension to the vice 
presidency, most members knew him personally.116 However, while Truman had personal 
connections he did not immediately command the same presence and leadership of Roosevelt. 
Over the course of his presidency Truman clashed with the Republicans, particularly in the 
Senate. Days before  Roosevelt’s  death,  Vandenberg  and  Senator  Robert  Taft,  the  Republican  
leader on domestic policy (similar to Vandenberg on foreign policy), called for the end of the 
Lend-Lease Act following the Second World War. Both supported the UN, but wanted Congress 
to control the money headed for the United Nations, instead of the executive as under Lend-
Lease.117 The  conflict  went  nowhere,  with  Roosevelt’s  death  stalling  the  process,  but  it  
demonstrated to Truman that even with the revered former president almost every point with 
Congress could become a fight. The next one would be coming soon, but now with Truman in 
the presidency. 
 The  San  Francisco  Conference  became  the  first  real  test  of  Truman’s  ability  to  fight  with  
Congress. While Vandenberg and other Republican representatives were members of the 
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delegation, it did not stop them from actively criticizing the administration. When the conference 
came to the veto crisis (described in Section III. San Francisco), Vandenberg went to Stettinius 
and threatened to end all Republican support for the United Nations if the Soviet Union did not 
back down on the issue of vetoing Security Council decisions involving themselves.118 Stettinius 
proceeded  to  tell  Vandenberg  about  Hopkins’  secret  mission  in  Moscow  to  convince  Stalin to 
support the United States, and tensions were relieved.119 But at a key moment the bipartisan 
consensus Hull and Roosevelt had created just a year before was almost lost. While 
Vandenberg’s  threat  to  pull  Republican  support  was  not  public  at  the  time,  even if it had been, 
the public may not have taken notice. Americans broadly supported the UN, but when polled on 
what the San Francisco Conference was doing in April of 1945 only around 30% knew it was for 
the international organization.120 The American public understood the simplest form of the idea 
for the UN, but the specifics were left to Congress and the administration. Truman, while he 
acted to sideline the United Nations, merely had to pay lip service to the institution in order to 
maintain public support. 
 Once the San Francisco Conference ended, passing the UN Charter in the United States 
was  easy.  With  the  organization  part  of  both  parties’  platforms  it  was  expected  to  be  ratified  
without incident. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the treaty and 
although many witnesses came to express their distaste for the treaty, with some calling it 
unconstitutional and others an alliance with communism, the committee and those in the gallery 
laughed at much of their testimony. In support of the treaty, both Anna Strauss, leader of the 
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League of Women Voters, and W.E.B. Dubois for the NAACP, came and voiced their support.121 
Both endorsements indicate the broad public support that accompanied the treaty. Just as a large 
portion of the American public supported the future United Nations, so did broad political 
organizations such as the League of Women Voters and NAACP. While neither represent 
monolithic or unified groups by any means, their public statements show that a broad cross-
section of the public was in favor of the organization. Within two weeks of the hearings the 
Senate was voting on the treaty. It was ratified, 89-2, on July 28th, 1945.122 The consensus that 
Roosevelt had created, in both Congress and the American public, sustained itself long enough to 
see his vision brought into existence.  
However, soon after its ratification, Truman and his administration began to shift away 
from the United Nations, favoring confrontation and unilateral action outside of the more 
multilateral organization instead, as seen through the Truman Doctrine, North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, and Korean War. In each case Truman was able to gain support in Congress, often 
via Vandenberg and Tom Connally, ranking members for the Republican and Democratic parties 
on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee respectively. While there was frequently some 
dissension, both from Democrats and Republicans, it was never to the point of truly disrupting 
Truman's  shift  from  Roosevelt’s  foreign  policy.  The  American  public  also did not stand in the 
way of Truman's changes. Although they overwhelmingly supported membership in the UN, 
Truman was able to simply acknowledge the organization's existence, and then ignore it with 
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little harm. Thus, with little consideration given to either the Congress or the American public, 
Truman  was  able  to  cripple  Roosevelt’s  vision  before  it  had  a  chance  to  stand. 
 The Truman Doctrine in March of 1947 was the first true test of the Truman 
administration’s  changes  to  foreign  policy.  With  Great  Britain unable to maintain its support for 
Greece and Turkey going forward, Truman had to turn to Congress for support. There was no 
money ready to give to the two countries without congressional approval, as had been the case 
with the Lend-Lease act.123 In order to garner support, Truman first went to Vandenberg and 
both  party’s  leaders  to  explain  the  situation.  Vandenberg  suggested  the  tactic  that  Truman  would  
ultimately  use  over  and  over  to  gain  Congress’s  support:  use  communism  to  get  around  any  
complaints about spending.124 Republicans in Congress wanted to cut the budget significantly, 
but by emphasizing communism as the threat that needed to be stopped in his address to 
Congress  Truman  was  able  to  gain  their  support.  No  members  wanted  to  seem  “soft”  on  
communism with the House Un-American Activities Committee having been made permanent 
that  year  and  Truman's  ‘loyalty  boards’  established  just  over  a  week  after  his  speech. 
The effort initially worked on Congress, pushing the United Nations out of the policy 
process, but the American public was not so easily convinced. When polled about whether the 
UN should have a larger role in Greece and Turkey, 56% supported it over unilateral American 
action. Truman and his administration had not been prepared for the public’s  response.125 
Congress acted quickly; following the criticism, Vandenberg and Connally co-sponsored an 
amendment to the aid bill. It included a preamble to the bill, stating that the United States was 
only acting because the United Nations was unable to respond. The amendment also committed 
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the United States to immediately end its support for Greece and Turkey if the United Nations 
called for it.126 While  the  public’s  concerns  were  tempered  by  the  amendment,  some  critics  in  
Congress still saw the bill as an affront to the United Nations. Senator Harry Byrd, a Democrat 
from Virginia, spoke immediately after Vandenberg proposed the amendment and argued that no 
one in the UN would step up to stop the United States action in Greece since many nations also 
wanted American aid. He  continued  on  to  say,  “After  introducing  the  bill  providing  for  the  
intervention in Greece and Turkey, the Senator from Michigan [Vandenberg] has proposed a 
preamble, denying that the United States intended to bypass the United Nations organization. 
This is merely a lot of pious words and one can imagine that when the officials of other 
governments  read  this  language  they  will  surely  think  he  ‘doth  protest  too  much.’”127 
As Senator Byrd shows, it was not lost on Congress that the Truman Doctrine went 
around  the  United  Nations,  offering  only  a  fig  leaf  in  the  form  of  Vandenberg’s  amendment  for  
the organization. Nevertheless, much of Congress did not care, the Truman Doctrine easily 
passed the Senate and House, allowing Truman to take his first step toward a policy 
confrontation with congressional support, but without structural multilateral support from the 
United Nations. The public was also aware that the US was going around the United Nations. In 
August of 1947 Thomas Hamilton wrote for the New York Times that,  “As  many  of  them  [the  
United Nations Secretariat and Delegations] see it, the Truman Doctrine not only rejected any 
use of the United Nations in extending help to Greece and Turkey, but laid down a program of 
American support for any government in any part of the world that said it was fighting 
communism.”  He  closed  the  article  by  wondering  if  the  United  Nations  had  a  bright  future  if  the  
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US and Soviet Union continued to fight and confront one another.128 The public was not wholly 
unaware the Truman administration was changing its foreign policy away from the United 
Nations Roosevelt had envisioned, but it did not care. When polled in the spring of the next year 
62% thought the United States had done all it could to make the United Nations successful. In 
the same poll almost none thought the US should bypass the organization in its policy, yet the 
United States did without much fanfare or public pushback129 With  Vandenberg’s  preamble,  the  
UN had received due respect in the eyes of Truman, and the American public generally agreed 
with him. While they supported the organization, the specifics of the Truman Doctrine did not 
raise their ire, leaving him to move on to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization two years later 
as the next step taken outside of the UN. 
Congress’s  acceptance  of  a  military  alliance  began  in  the  summer  of  1948.  The  Berlin  
Blockade was about to begin and tensions were high in Europe. Vandenberg brought forth the 
‘Vandenberg  Resolution’,  which  called  for  the  United  States  to  enter  a  military alliance against 
communism. Connally, who also was part of the American delegation to the San Francisco 
Conference,  went  on  the  Senate  floor  to  offer  support  for  the  resolution  stating  that,  “Many  of  us  
have been somewhat disappointed in the activities, or the lack of activities, of the United Nations 
Organization  with  regard  to  many  international  questions.”130 Connally’s  comments  display  that  
even those present at the negotiations to form the UN in San Francisco, as he was, had begun to 
question the effectiveness of the organization. The United Nations was disappointing because it 
was  not  acting  with  Truman’s  framework  of  unilateral  action.  Thus  support  for  a  military  
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alliance was high in Congress with the resolution passing the Senate 64-4, almost the same level 
of consensus as when the UN Charter had passed.131 It would be almost a year until the notion of 
an alliance came to Congress again. In spring of 1949, Dean Acheson began working with 
Connally and Vandenberg to grow congressional support for what would become the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization.132 While support for an alliance was strong, the effort was 
hampered  by  the  possibility  of  the  USs  being  dragged  into  war  without  Congress’  consent,  and  
by the opposition of Robert Taft. Taft normally stayed out of foreign policy, leaving it to 
Vandenberg, but in the case of NATO, and later the Korean War, he took the opportunity to 
attack Truman for reckless spending and leading the United States toward war.133 However, as 
much as Taft complained, he was not seen as the leader on foreign policy. His outburst did little 
to stop Republican support or NATO. 
The general public was similarly supportive of NATO as Congress, while there was some 
dissent the sentiment was largely in favor of the treaty. One New York Times article went so far 
as  to  claim  the  ‘Atlantic  Pact’  made  the  United  Nations  stronger  as  a  result.134 The only solid 
opposition to the threat came from Henry Wallace, now leader of the Progressive Party. He 
charged that NATO was not only a violation of the UN Charter  but  also  Roosevelt’s  vision  for  
the future.135 His criticism fell on deaf ears; while he still had a base of support, Wallace was no 
longer  seen  as  inside  the  Democratic  party,  thus  allowing  his  attack  to  be  written  off.  Truman’s  
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administration paid the same lip service it had to the United Nations with the Truman Doctrine 
with NATO, arguing it was allowed within Article 51 of the Charter outlining self-defense. But, 
as  Kaplan  notes  in  his  book  on  the  United  States  and  NATO,  “There  was  no  avoidance  of  a  
direct conflict between a treaty of military alliances and a charter of collective security. To 
accept one meant to deny the other. The administration tried to keep the facade. It failed, but by 
1949, when the alliance was made, the country had been sufficiently prepared to pay a price it 
might  not  have  paid  in  1947  or  1948”:  the  end  of  the  United Nations as a truly functional 
organization.136  
Surprisingly, 1949 saw public satisfaction with the United Nations improve and a 
majority of Americans approved of it for the first time since its founding. While the American 
public had always supported the organization, they had not always been happy with it. Scott and 
Withney  note  in  their  work  on  public  opinion  towards  the  UN  that,  “As  dramatic  world  conflicts  
tended more and more to take place outside the framework of the United Nations, the inevitable 
frustrations  of  world  entanglements  were  not  so  readily  associated  with  it.”137 In turning his back 
on the organization, Truman had made it more popular; but even this change did not result in a 
revival of the organization. By 1949 both Congress and the American  public  supported  Truman’s  
confrontational policy. The Soviet Union was the enemy and communism must be stopped and it 
must be done with military force, rather than through diplomacy. Truman put his policy into 
action the next summer when the Korean War began. 
When the Korean War broke out Truman bypassed both the United Nations and 
Congress, committing military support before the UN authorized it and without congressional 
approval.  While  Congress  eventually  pushed  back  on  Truman’s  authority  to  conduct  a war, the 
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United Nations never did. The UN guidelines for the peace, including stopping at the 38th 
parallel, were ignored and Truman saw no repercussions. With his announcement on June 27th 
committing American air and naval power in Korea, the House of Representatives paused and 
read  the  statement  to  cheers.  Governor  Dewey  even  publicly  announced  his  support  for  Truman’s  
decision to commit the military.138 However the next day Taft leaned into Truman about the war. 
He argued that Truman was overstepping his role as Commander in Chief without congressional 
approval, leaving out Republicans in his decision making, and went so far as to accuse the 
administration  of  inviting  attack  with  the  omission  of  Korea  from  Acheson’s  defense  perimeter  
in his speech to the National Press Club earlier that year.139 Unlike  Taft’s  speech  on  NATO,  this  
one gained traction, leading to further calls amongst Republicans that Truman come and address 
Congress and ask for its support. Truman considered the idea. Acheson in particular was 
supportive, hoping it would quell any domestic issues for a time. But Truman never addressed 
Congress and instead waited almost a month before asking for legislation in support of his 
decisions.  While  Taft  had  questioned  the  legality  of  Truman’s  actions, the political aspect is what 
cost him congressional support over time, limiting what he could get through Congress in 
support of the war after ignoring it in the beginning.140 However no one was willing to push 
Truman to pull out of Korea. He had successfully pushed both the American public and Congress 
to accept his confrontation with communism and the Soviet Union without the UN. Neither 
group cared that he had initiated military support prior to UN approval, only that he had done it 
without congressional approval, firmly cementing American foreign policy in a realm outside of 
the United Nations. 
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The people of the United States never turned their back on the United Nations, at least in 
their own view. Throughout the Korean War (and earlier), support for the United States to 
remain a member of the organization remained above 70%.141 While each new policy the 
Truman administration pushed maintained a ceremonial place for the United Nations, ultimately 
neither Congress nor the American public cared that it had been reduced to a figurehead and 
nothing more. Truman successfully placed the organization out of consideration, taking the 
popular support for internationalism built by Roosevelt and using it to pursue a foreign policy 
that more or less ignored the organization he had envisioned. In 1954 the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee reviewed the UN Charter. Part of the effort was to determine if any 
changes needed to be made to make the organization more effective. After talking to countless 
witnesses, and receiving  hundreds  of  pages  of  written  testimony  the  committee  stated,  “The  
principal consensus of opinion was that the world is in trouble and something needs to be done. 
There was no agreement as to what to do, who should do it, what the results of specific proposals 
would be; nor was there evidence that the American people are aware of the full implications of 
the  various  proposals.”142 The path forward Roosevelt had envisioned and championed nearly a 
decade prior was gone. The Senate, and the members of the public that they interviewed thought 
the world was in trouble. But no one knew what to do about that. The United Nations was meant 
to be a place for finding consensus and proposing solutions, instead it had become a system in 
need of repair after almost eight  years  under  Truman’s  watch.  His  presidency  left  the  UN with no 
path  forward.  Truman  had  taken  the  consensus,  built  over  Roosevelt’s  four  terms,  around  
working toward an international organization, and twisted it into a policy of confrontation that 
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left the UN without a place in American foreign policy. The United States was supposed to act, 
the Congress and American people were supposed to support it, and the United Nations was 
supposed to approve the decisions after the fact––and it did. 
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Conclusion 
 The United Nations barely had a chance to stand before it was pushed aside by Harry 
Truman.  Although  Truman  saw  through  the  creation  of  Roosevelt’s  vision,  it  was  soon  left  out  in  
the cold; the United States would confront global crises alone. Roosevelt had intended for the 
United Nations to be the central force for peace in foreign policy after its creation. It was meant 
to protect and uphold his deeply held ideals set out in the Four Freedoms speech and the Atlantic 
Charter. Instead, Truman established the organization at San Francisco, but then began slowly 
and  purposefully  moving  the  United  States  away  from  the  UN,  all  while  claiming  Roosevelt’s  
legacy to it.   
 After  San  Francisco,  Truman  began  pushing  out  those  who  supported  Roosevelt’s  vision.  
Secretary of State Edward Stettinius was asked to resign and become the first American 
representative to the United Nations. Expecting to still be a central part of the administration's 
foreign policy in the role, as Roosevelt intended, Stettinius accepted. However, he, like the UN, 
was slowly pushed out of the decision making process. Stettinius eventually resigned after 
repeatedly  disagreeing  with  how  Truman  interacted  with  the  UN  and  treated  him.  Stettinius’  
departure  is  indicative  of  Truman’s  administration  as a whole, aides and cabinet members 
steadily left as Truman created his own administration, all while arguing it was the same vision 
Roosevelt  proclaimed.  With  Henry  Wallace’s  removal  as  Secretary  of  Commerce  in  September  
of 1946, who Roosevelt stated he would prefer to be his vice president in 1944, only one cabinet 
member  from  Roosevelt’s  administration  remained.  Truman  went  so  far  as  to  label  those  
defending  Wallace  and  his  more  cooperative  policy  toward  the  Soviet  Union  as  ‘crackpots.’143 
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Those aides still in the administration, such as Dean Acheson, were firmly with Truman that the 
Cold War meant confronting the Soviet Union unilaterally, leaving the United Nations aside. 
 Truman proceeded to create his foreign policy divorced from the UN. In March of 1947, 
with Great Britain no longer able to support Greece, Truman proclaimed that it now fell to the 
United States to support them, and all free peoples around the world. The United Nations was 
completely left aside in the process, not even consulted before Truman made his speech. The 
American peoples expressed outrage at the administration for going around the UN, but it was 
quelled when Senator Vandenberg added a preamble detailing that the United States was only 
acting because the United Nations could not. However, this announcement did not stop all 
criticism.  As  Senator  Byrd  noted  after  the  preamble’s  announcement  in  Congress  that  it  was  
merely,  “a  lot  of  pious  words”  which  would  not  fool  anyone  that  the  United  States  was  acting  
alone.144  
 The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 pushed the United States 
further away from the UN. The new alliance created a separate framework where the United 
States could focus on military confrontation with the Soviet Union, instead of using the United 
Nations to try and achieve peace. While the organization was not only desired by the US but also 
many states in Western Europe, it came from an abundance of fear of Soviet aggression, leading 
to  a  further  distancing  with  the  UN.  Truman’s  decisions  separating the United States from the 
UN all came together in the Korean War. Truman committed the United States military to the 
conflict before the UN called for military action, even telling Secretary of State Acheson that the 
United States would fight the war without the UN if it had to.145 Over two thirds of the NATO 
members joined the US in fighting North Korea, the alliance was taking up a military 
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confrontation and would be further expanded during the conflict with the rearmament of West 
Germany and an increase of American troops in Western Europe. While acting outside of the 
United Nations, the Truman administration also repeatedly killed efforts at negotiating with 
Communist China, refusing to even consider giving them the permanent seat on the Security 
Council, or support the multiple popular attempts to find common ground accepted by NATO, 
Communist, and neutral countries alike.  
Throughout  all  of  Truman’s  foreign  policy  decisions  to  abandon  the  United  Nations,  
Congress and the American people largely supported him. Although Truman was often 
responding to foreign crises and domestic pressures Truman choose those responses, creating an 
activist  and  unilateral  foreign  policy  in  the  place  of  Roosevelt’s  internationalist  one.  While some 
in Congress, such as Senator Byrd,  occasionally  opposed  Truman’s  decision  sidelining  the  UN,  
most in the Democratic party followed their president, and most in the Republican party 
followed Senator Vandenberg, whose support Truman cultivated. The American public were 
initially aghast at Truman going around the United Nations, but their opposition did not amount 
to any political consequences beyond lip service to the organization surrounding the Truman 
Doctrine, NATO, and Korean War. While he claimed to follow Roosevelt's vision for the 
organization, instead Truman left it in the cold, as a rubber stamp for his unilateral and 
confrontational policy towards the Soviet Union and any major international crisis he saw fit. 
The United Nations was no longer a part of American foreign policy.  
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